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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA) granted a tax holiday to U.S.
corporations with foreign subsidiaries, allowing the subsidiaries to remit certain funds to
their parents at a much lower tax rate than previously possible.1 The holiday applied only
to repatriations occurring before the second fiscal year-end following enactment of the
law, allowing firms between one and two years to make qualifying transfers.2 Many
firms acted during this window of opportunity, and foreign subsidiaries distributed more
than $300 billion in qualifying dividends to their U.S. parents.3
Scholars have studied various economic consequences of the tax holiday. Some
studies have investigated the law’s impact on stock market prices,4 while others have
analyzed the ways in which the repatriated cash has been put to use.5 One question that
∗
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1
The AJCA provided for the holiday by creating I.R.C. § 965, a new section of the Internal Revenue Code.
The AJCA had many other provisions as well, but the focus of the analysis in this paper is the tax holiday
for repatriated earnings. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418.
2
I.R.C. § 965(f) (2006) restricts the time during which the election can occur. The taxable year mentioned
in § 965(f) is generally the same as the fiscal year.
3
See Melissa Redmiles, The One-Time Dividend Received Deduction, IRS STAT. OF INCOME BULL., Spring
2008, at 102, available at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=183126,00.html.
4
For evidence of negative abnormal stock returns around the time of enactment of the AJCA for firms that
would later choose to repatriate, see generally Thomas J. Brennan, Cash-Flow and Market Response to
Repatriation (paper presented at 3rd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1134040. For additional findings, see generally Ramin Baghai, Corporate
Governance and Extraordinary Earnings Repatriations: Evidence from the American Jobs Creation Act
(paper presented at AFA 2010 Atlanta Meetings, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1311429.
But see Mitchell Oler, Terry Shevlin & Ryan Wilson, Examining Investor Expectations Concerning Tax
Savings on the Repatriations of Foreign Earnings under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, 29 J. AM.
TAX’N ASS’N 25-55 (2007), for evidence that there may have been a long-term abnormal increase in stock
performance.
5
For evidence that repatriated funds were used to return value to shareholders, primarily through the
repurchase of stock, see Jennifer L. Blouin & Linda K. Krull, Bringing It Home: A Study of the Incentives
Surrounding the Repatriation of Foreign Earnings Under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (July 21,
2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=925348; see also Dhammika
Dharmapala, C. Fritz Foley & Kristin J. Forbes, Watch What I Do, Not What I Say: The Unintended
Consequences of the Homeland Investment Act (MIT Sloan, Research Paper No. 4741, presented at CELS
2009 4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1337206. But see Brennan, supra note 4, and Mitchell A. Petersen & Michael W.
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has not yet received scholarly attention, however, is whether the holiday has had a lasting
impact on the behavior of multinational firms based in the United States.6 Specifically,
have firms increased the amount of earnings they keep permanently reinvested overseas
as a result of the holiday? Are they, perhaps, increasing the proportion of their earnings
generated overseas, keeping those foreign-based earnings abroad and anticipating that a
future holiday will allow such funds to be repatriated at a lower tax rate?
The goal of this Article is to analyze these questions. The approach taken is
empirical. This Article relies on publicly available data that detail the overseas
investment behavior of corporations that repatriated large amounts of cash under the
AJCA.7 These data are analyzed using statistical regression techniques, testing the
hypothesis that there has been an increase in overseas investment by these multinational
firms. The findings are broadly consistent with such an increase in overseas investment.
Moreover, the findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the cash inflow to the
United States of repatriated funds has already been substantially offset by the increased
levels of foreign earnings being permanently reinvested overseas in the wake of the
AJCA.
These findings help elucidate the full effect of the AJCA tax holiday and serve as a
basis for evaluating whether the law achieved desired policy goals. Assuming that a
return of foreign earnings to the United States was the sole policy goal,8 the AJCA was
unarguably a short-term success, as substantial amounts of cash were returned to U.S.
parent corporations during the window permitted by § 965.9 However, this short-term
success must be weighed against the accompanying long-term effects. This Article
shows that since the holiday window, there has been a dramatic increase in the rate at
which firms add to their stockpile of foreign earnings kept overseas. The long-term result
Faulkender, Investment and Capital Constraints: Repatriations Under the American Jobs Creation Act
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15248, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1454981, for evidence to the contrary, indicating that cash may have been used for
other purposes.
6
The question of future behavioral changes in firms was considered from an ex ante perspective by the
Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) in connection with the revenue estimates the JCT performed for
legislation proposals providing for a repatriation tax holiday. See Edward D. Kleinbard & Patrick Driessen,
A Revenue Estimate Case Study: The Repatriation Holiday Revisited, 120 TAX NOTES 1191 (2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1270370. In particular, “[t]he JCT staff concluded that at least some
taxpayers would change their future behavior to anticipate a second round of section 965-type relief, by
investing more offshore than they would have done had a one-time tax holiday not been enacted, and
keeping the resulting earnings offshore indefinitely.” Id. The work of the JCT was necessarily forward
looking in nature, because it was designed to estimate the effect of a law that had not yet been enacted.
Moreover, the details of the JCT’s analysis and predictions about specific changes in firm behavior are not
available to the public. With the benefit of hindsight, however, it is now possible to examine publicly
available information on actual firm behavior in detail and to analyze changes in the wake of the holiday.
It is this ex post question that has not previously been addressed in the literature.
7
As explained further in Part III(A), this Article studies firms that repatriated at least $500 million during
the holiday window.
8
There were in fact specific policy goals beyond the simple return of funds to the United States. In
particular, I.R.C. § 965(b) (2006) requires repatriated funds to be “invested in the United States pursuant to
a domestic reinvestment plan which . . . provides for the reinvestment of such [funds] in the United States
(other than as payment for executive compensation), including as a source for the funding of worker hiring
and training, infrastructure, research and development, capital investments, or the financial stabilization of
the corporation for the purposes of job retention or creation.” For purposes of the current discussion,
however, the focus is only on the broad goal that foreign earnings be returned to the United States and not
on the specific goals for the use of the funds once they were returned.
9
See Redmiles, supra note 3, at 103.
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has been an aggregate increase in new foreign earnings added to the overseas stockpile
that is greater than the amount of funds repatriated pursuant to the holiday. From this
perspective, it seems that the AJCA may have been a net failure in achieving the policy
goal of returning foreign earnings to the United States.10
These research findings also help evaluate the policy implications of granting other
temporary holidays and amnesties, both in connection with the repatriation of foreign
earnings and in other areas that allow for the possibility of a second holiday at some
future point. Legislation permitting such a reprieve sends a signal to those subject to
certain rules that the legislature is willing to grant occasional suspensions of the rules.
This signal operates to condition those subject to the rules to anticipate the opportunities
of future holidays and arrange their affairs accordingly, and this long-term effect needs to
be taken into account when considering the policy implications of a proposed holiday.
The fact that such conditioning can occur is certainly not new, and it dates at least back to
Pavlov and his dogs.11 Moreover, it is particularly well understood that temporary
changes in law can affect future behavior, since rational actors will incorporate the
likelihood of future legal changes into their decision-making. Indeed, the Joint
Committee on Taxation (JCT) incorporates this type of behavioral change into its
statistical models when calculating revenue estimates for proposed legislation,12 and
commentators have already made the point that the AJCA holiday has encouraged firms
to become more aggressive in their tax planning.13 Nevertheless, the evidence provided
in this Article will be useful in understanding the degree and speed to which behavior
based on such conditioning can occur, particularly in the situations involving substantial
economic stakes.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part II gives background about
the tax and accounting rules for foreign earnings, as well as the details of the AJCA tax
holiday requirements. Part III describes the data used to analyze firm behavior. Part IV
describes statistical tests of hypotheses about corporate behavior and reports the results.
Part V discusses and draws conclusions based on the results of these statistical tests.
II. BACKGROUND

¶7

To facilitate the discussion and analysis in the remainder of this Article, it is helpful
to review briefly certain aspects of U.S. taxation of the earnings of foreign subsidiaries
with domestic parents. Although amounts earned in an active business by a subsidiary
are generally currently taxable in the foreign jurisdiction, they may not be subject to
immediate U.S. taxation. Instead, tax is not generally due in the United States until such
time as a dividend of the earnings is made from the subsidiary to the parent.14 A foreign
10

Foreign earnings may now be kept overseas in anticipation of a future tax holiday or other change in law.
If such a holiday occurs, a substantial amount of foreign earnings will again be remitted to the United
States, and thus over a much longer term, the net effect of the AJCA, coupled with the future change in
law, may be to create a net inflow of foreign earnings to the United States. This future holiday, however,
may then lead to a future increase in foreign earnings kept overseas as well, resulting again in a long-term
net failure to return foreign earnings to the United States.
11
See generally IVAN PAVLOV, LECTURES ON THE WORK OF THE PRINCIPAL DIGESTIVE GLANDS (1897).
12
See Kleinbard & Driessen, supra note 6.
13
Alex Berenson, Tax Break Used by Drug Makers Failed to Add Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2007, at A1.
14
A shareholder of stock in a corporation typically recognizes income for U.S. tax purposes on the income
of the corporation only when a dividend of the earnings is made. See I.R.C. § 301 (2006). This general
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subsidiary located in a low-tax jurisdiction may therefore have an incentive to keep
foreign earnings abroad so as to avoid paying additional taxes in the United States.15
¶8
The financial accounting rules also provide an incentive for U.S.-based
multinational corporations to keep foreign earnings abroad. The deferred tax liability that
a parent corporation would owe upon a dividend of foreign earnings from a subsidiary is
not required to be recognized, provided that the earnings are permanently reinvested in
the foreign country.16 Thus, a U.S. parent that does not repatriate earnings from a foreign
subsidiary as a dividend, but instead keeps them permanently reinvested in the foreign
subsidiary, can avoid not only current U.S. taxation but also the reporting of a deferred
tax liability for financial accounting purposes.
¶9
Due in part to these taxation and accounting rules, substantial amounts of foreign
earnings were and are kept in foreign subsidiaries and not repatriated to U.S. parents.
The tax holiday of the AJCA was intended to incentivize the repatriation of at least some
of these foreign funds. The mechanism used was a temporary tax deduction for U.S.
parent corporations in the amount of 85% of cash dividends that were received from
foreign subsidiaries and met the requirements of the newly created I.R.C. § 965. Thus, if
the normal corporate tax rate was 35%, an 85% deduction resulted in an effective tax rate
of 5.25%.17 The substantially reduced effective tax rate encouraged firms to repatriate
permanently reinvested foreign earnings.
¶10
The AJCA tax holiday was limited in time,18 and the years since the AJCA window
may represent a period during which firms increased the amount of foreign earnings kept
abroad, assuming a conditioned behavioral response as discussed above in Part I. To
determine the existence of a conditioned response, the amount of earnings permanently
reinvested overseas by firms must be ascertained. Fortunately, it is possible to obtain this
information for many public corporations. Although such companies are not required to
recognize the deferred U.S. tax liability associated with permanently reinvested foreign
earnings, as discussed above, these companies generally report any material amounts of
such earnings in their publicly available financial statements. It is thus possible to review
firm financial statements to determine the aggregate amount of permanently reinvested
earnings held in the foreign subsidiaries of a parent in each fiscal year. Part III describes
the data collection process for this analysis.

rule applies in the case of a U.S. parent corporation with respect to the earnings of its subsidiary
corporations, but there are exceptions for certain types of income of subsidiaries that are “controlled
foreign corporations” within the meaning of I.R.C. § 957. See I.R.C. § 951. For the earnings of foreign
subsidiaries considered in this Article, however, the general rule is followed so that U.S. tax is not due on
foreign earnings of a subsidiary until a dividend is made.
15
In general, credits will be allowed against U.S. taxes for foreign taxes paid by the subsidiary. See I.R.C.
§ 901. If the subsidiary is located in a low-tax jurisdiction, however, these credits will not offset the full
amount of the U.S. tax liability, and the parent corporation will remain liable for the excess of the amount
of U.S. tax liability over the amount of the foreign tax credits.
16
Paragraph 173 of the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) No. 109 explains that
“recognition of a deferred tax liability for undistributed earnings that are or will be invested in a foreign
entity indefinitely” is not required due to the complexity involved in calculating such a deferred tax
liability. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO.
109, ¶ 173 (1992) [hereinafter FAS NO. 109].
17
The computation is 35% × (100% – 85%) = 5.25%.
18
Qualifying repatriations had to occur by the end of the fiscal year that began after the date of enactment
of the AJCA in October 2004. I.R.C. § 965(f).
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III. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA
A. Selection of Firms and Determination of PRE Values

¶11

Data was collected in order to analyze the question of corporate behavioral changes
after the AJCA tax holiday. The sample consisted of large firms known to have
significant amounts of permanently reinvested earnings and to have taken advantage of
the AJCA tax holiday. For each such corporation, publicly available financial filings
were reviewed for a period of years to determine the amount of foreign earnings the
corporation had permanently reinvested each year.
¶12
The selection of firms started with the identification of all constituents of the S&P
500 Index on October 11, 2004.19 The S&P 500 Index was selected because it is a
sample of manageable size for purposes of data collection, but also because it is broadly
representative of large publicly traded firms in the United States. In addition, this sample
appeared particularly appropriate after initial stages of data collection, inasmuch as it
contained the firms that represented the vast bulk of all funds repatriated under the AJCA
holiday. The annual financial filings of firms were reviewed for the first and second
fiscal years ending after this date,20 and the set of firms was limited to those that reported
a repatriation of foreign earnings in an amount in excess of $500 million pursuant to the
provisions of I.R.C. § 965.21 Any firms that did not report a specific amount of
repatriated funds, or those for which the specific amount of funds repatriated was
ambiguous, were eliminated from the sample. Finally, annual filings for the remaining
firms were reviewed for the fiscal years22 from 1997 through 2008 to determine whether
aggregate amounts of permanently reinvested earnings23 (PRE) in foreign subsidiaries
were regularly reported. Firms were eliminated from the sample if they did not report
such amounts in a majority of years during the twelve-year period. This procedure
resulted in the list of seventy-three firms appearing in the Appendix, and this is the
sample of firms that is analyzed in this Article.
¶13
The sample of seventy-three firms represents only a small fraction of all
corporations in the United States and also only a relatively small fraction of all firms on
the S&P 500. Nonetheless, these seventy-three firms account for the bulk of PRE
19

This was the date that the conference report for the AJCA was agreed to in the Senate, and the bill was
cleared for approval by the White House. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, H.R. 4520, 108th Cong.
(enacted) (as passed by Senate, Oct. 11, 2004), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d108:HR04520:@@@L&summ2=m&.
20
Two fiscal years were reviewed because elections under I.R.C. § 965 had to be made between October
22, 2004 and the end of the second fiscal year after that date. I.R.C. § 965(f).
21
The number $500 million was chosen because it is the safe-harbor amount allowed by I.R.C. §
965(b)(1)(A). This amount thus represents an amount that the drafters of the AJCA legislation considered
substantial.
22
Throughout this Article, any reference to a fiscal year corresponding to a particular calendar year
indicates that the fiscal year for the company ends between July 1st of the specified calendar year and June
30th of the following calendar year. For example, the fiscal year of a firm ending on March 30, 1998, is
termed fiscal year 1997, and the fiscal year of a firm ending on September 30, 1998, is termed fiscal year
1998.
23
Permanently reinvested earnings are those earnings of a foreign subsidiary that have not been paid as a
dividend to the U.S. parent and are intended to be invested outside the United States indefinitely. Under
FAS NO. 109, a deferred tax liability for such earnings need not be recognized. See supra note 16. Despite
not recognizing or reporting such a deferred tax liability, a firm with an amount of PRE it deems to be
material generally reports the amount of the PRE in its annual financial statements, and it is this reported
amount that is collected for the data set analyzed by this Article.
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amounts that were returned to the United States in response to the repatriation tax
holiday. In fact, these firms reported aggregate repatriations totaling over $246.5 billion,
an amount that accounts for nearly 79% of all repatriations pursuant to § 965.24 Thus,
these firms are responsible for the bulk of all funds repatriated during the AJCA tax
holiday, and they may be particularly likely to exhibit behavioral changes if they do
indeed anticipate a future such holiday someday.
¶14
The sample firms’ reported PRE amounts were available in most years, with more
than 90% of the sample reporting PRE amounts for fiscal years 1999 through 2008, and
more than 75% of the sample firms reporting PRE amounts for fiscal years 1997 and
1998. Figure 1 presents the aggregate PRE amounts for firms in the sample for fiscal
years 1998 through 2008, with a special demarcation of the amount of repatriated funds
placed in the column corresponding to the 2005 fiscal year.25 As seen from the figure,
the aggregate PRE of sample firms has been substantial in terms of dollars at stake over
the years. It rose steadily from just over $100 billion in fiscal year 1998 to about $400
billion shortly before the repatriations occurred. Since the repatriation, the total amount
of PRE for the sample firms has increased to about $600 billion. This is striking
preliminary evidence that the earnings returned from foreign subsidiaries to the United
States under the AJCA tax holiday have already been largely offset by increased new
investment of foreign earnings overseas. Further evidence and statistical testing of this
hypothesis follows in Part IV.

24

In Redmiles, supra note 3, at 104, Figure A reports that the total amount of qualifying dividends under §
965 was $312.3 billion, based on confidential non-public filings by taxpayers with the IRS. The ratio of
$246.5 billion to $312.3 billion is 78.9%. Reported amounts in financial statements may not be the same as
amounts reported to the IRS for a variety of reasons, including the possibility that they may include
unqualified portions of dividends as well as qualified portions. Such discrepancies should, however, be
relatively small.
25
Repatriations under § 965 may have occurred any time during the first two fiscal years ending after
October 22, 2004, but, for convenience, Figure 1 shows the aggregate amount of repatriations all occurring
in fiscal year 2005.
PRE values for firms are grouped according to fiscal year, rather than calendar year. Firms may have
different fiscal year ends, thus PRE values for different firms may correspond to somewhat different
calendar time periods. A lack of synchronicity is unavoidable, however, because the data are available only
from the annual filings of firms, which follow the fiscal year cycle. This discord should not create
problems for the analysis of this Article, which is focused on the long-term pattern of firm behavior and not
short-term temporal distinctions.
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Figure 1: Aggregate PRE Values and Aggregate Repatriation Amounts
¶15

The reported PRE amounts stated in the financial filings of firms in the sample
were used to compute the change in PRE from year to year, denoted ∆PRE. The value of
∆PRE for a firm in each fiscal year from 1998 through 2008 was calculated as the value
of PRE for the firm in that fiscal year, minus the corresponding value in the preceding
fiscal year.26 Figure 2 illustrates the average ∆PRE for firms in the sample during each
fiscal year from 1998 through 2008. Figure 2 shows that the annual increase in PRE has
accelerated from $500 million per firm to around $1500 million per firm from the period
before the AJCA tax holiday to the period afterward.

26

The one exception to this procedure was Coca-Cola Enterprises, which reported annual changes rather
than aggregate amounts. In the case of Coca-Cola Enterprises, ∆PRE values were directly observed, and
PRE values were calculated as the accumulated amount of PRE over time, beginning with a base amount of
no PRE reported in early years.
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Figure 2: ∆PRE Values Before, During, and After the Repatriation Window
B. Grouping the Data
¶16

The seventy-three firms in the data set represent a variety of industries, and to
facilitate analysis of whether different industries have different behavioral changes, the
firms were organized into eight groups for purposes of the current study according to
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes.27 Table 1 details the
number and percentage of firms appearing in each group, and it indicates the three or four
digit prefix of the NAICS codes for firms in each group.28 Table 1 also provides brief
group descriptions.
27

Federal statistical agencies use NAICS codes to classify business establishments. The codes are
available on the NAICS website at http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/.
28
NAICS codes are generally six-digit numbers, but the first three digits are indicative of a broader
category to which firms belong. Multiple three-digit prefixes were organized to form the eight groups.
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Group

NAICS
Codes

Description

1

311, 312

Food, Beverage and Tobacco Mfg.

6

8.2

2

321, 322

Wood Product and Paper Mfg.

5

6.8

3

324, 325, 5419

Petroleum, Coal Products and Chemical Mfg.

19

26.0

4

334, 335, 5415

Computer and Electrical Equipment Mfg.

16

21.9

5

333, 336, 339

Machinery, Equipment and Miscellaneous Mfg.

12

16.4

6

511, 517

Software and Telecommunications

5

6.8

7

522, 523, 524

Finance and Insurance

7

9.6

8

721, 722, 999

Accommodation, Food and Other

3

4.1

73

100.0

Total

Firms

%

Table 1: Groups of Companies by Industry
A simple analysis of aggregate ∆PRE values for groups within the sample before
and after the repatriation window of the AJCA gives an indication of which groups of
firms may have adopted behavioral changes in the wake of the AJCA tax holiday. Table
2 lists the aggregate amounts29 of all ∆PRE values in each group of sample firms for the
period spanning fiscal years 1998 through 2003 and the period spanning fiscal years 2006
through 2008. These periods were chosen to come entirely before and entirely after the
time permitted for repatriations under the AJCA.30 The table also indicates the aggregate
amounts repatriated pursuant to § 965.
¶18
As shown in Table 2, for each of Groups 3 through 8, the new PRE invested since
the AJCA tax holiday exceeds the total amount repatriated during the holiday. Moreover,
the newly invested amount for each of these groups also exceeds the total amount of PRE
in the period prior to the holiday. For Groups 1 and 2, the new PRE investments are
close in size to the amounts repatriated, and for Group 1, the newly invested amount also
exceeds the total amount of PRE in the period prior to the holiday. Thus, all sample
groups experienced a dramatic post-holiday increase in PRE, providing evidence across a
wide range of firm types for the behavioral conditioning discussed in Part I.

¶17

Note that two four-digit prefixes are also used: 5419 and 5415. The four-digit prefix 5419 corresponded to
IMS Health Inc., which was placed in Group 3, and the four-digit prefix 5415 corresponded to International
Business Machines, which was placed in Group 4.
29
All amounts in Table 2 are expressed in millions of dollars.
30
I.R.C. § 965(f) (2006) requires repatriations to be made before the second fiscal year end following
October 22, 2004. Generally, this means that repatriations needed to be completed during either fiscal year
2004 or fiscal year 2005.
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Aggregate
Aggregate
Aggregate
∆PRE
Repatriations
∆PRE
Group
1998-2003
Under AJCA
2006-2008
1
15.45
22.89
22.22
2
8.25
6.50
4.04
3
108.71
123.52
126.93
4
36.80
52.39
61.58
5
11.15
14.64
23.07
6
9.63
7.44
17.39
7
16.20
14.38
31.51
8
9.02
4.75
42.44
Total
215.21
246.51
329.18
Table 2: Aggregate Repatriation Amounts and Changes in PRE
C. Compustat Data
In addition to the PRE and ∆PRE values described above, it was also necessary for
the analysis of Part IV to ascertain the amounts of foreign and domestic annual pre-tax
income for firms in the sample for fiscal years 1998 through 2008. This additional
information was obtained from the Compustat database. The foreign pre-tax income
amount is denoted PIFO, and the domestic pretax income amount is denoted PIDOM.
¶20
While values of PIFO, PIDOM, and ∆PRE were not available in certain years for
certain firms, values for all three variables were available in the vast majority of fiscal
years for firms in the sample. The Part IV analysis makes use of these three variables
during the period of fiscal years from 1998 through 2003 and the period from 2006
through 2008—a total of nine fiscal years. Observations of all three data items are
available for 545 firm-years during these time periods, representing about 83% of the
total number of firm-years during the period analyzed.31 Table 3 provides summary
statistics for these 545 observations of firm-years, and it is this set of observations that is
used in performing the statistical analyses reported in Part IV.32
¶19

31

The total number of firm-years in this period for firms in the sample is 9 × 73 = 657. The computation of
the fraction of firm-years with available data is thus 545 ÷ 657 = 82.95%.
32
All average and standard deviation amounts in Table 3 are expressed in millions of dollars.
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∆PRE

Number of
Observations

Average

Standard
Deviation

346
528.867
1126.351
1998-2003
199
1560.877
2682.861
2006-2008
545
905.693
1916.165
Both Periods
PIFO
346
1090.816
1586.259
1998-2003
199
2522.113
3260.625
2006-2008
545
1613.437
2437.447
Both Periods
PIDOM
346
1321.255
2707.377
1998-2003
199
1041.871
5831.598
2006-2008
545
1219.242
4128.489
Both Periods
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Data Set Used in Regression Analyses
IV. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
A. Increase in ∆PRE and PIFO in Dollar Terms
¶21

A basic linear regression tests the hypothesis that firms have increased the amount
of ∆PRE from the time before the AJCA tax holiday to the time after. Specifically, the
value of ∆PRE is regressed against a “dummy” variable, δT, which has the value 0 for
fiscal years 1998 through 2003 and the value 1 for fiscal years 2006 through 2008. This
regression is expressed in the formula:
∆PRE it = Fg + c 0δ itT + ε it .

The subscript i runs through the seventy-three firms in the sample described in Part III,
and the subscript t runs through fiscal years 1998 through 2003 and fiscal years 2006
through 2008.33 The term Fg denotes a control for group fixed effects, allowing for the
possibility that each group may have a different baseline amount for ∆PRE that needs to
be controlled for in the regression. The term ε denotes the residual error in the
regression. The value c0 is the coefficient of δT that is determined by the regression.
¶22
The result of this first regression is shown in column (a) of Table 4.34 The
coefficient of δT is statistically significant at the 1% level35 and also substantial in size,
33

Note that the regression omitted fiscal years 2004 and 2005, which is the AJCA repatriation window.
The goal of this and the following regressions is to analyze the difference between the periods before and
after the AJCA repatriation window. As a result, the years of the repatriation window are omitted from
consideration in these analyses.
34
Columns of the table represent separate regressions, and rows of the table represent variables
corresponding to coefficients computed in the regressions. Not all variables are present in all regressions,
and, consequently, some cells within the table are empty. The value reported for each regression and
variable is the point estimate of the coefficient, and the value below in parentheses is the robust standard
error estimate. The estimate is made using a covariance matrix corrected for heteroskedasticity following
Halbert White, A Heteroskedastic Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test of
Heteroskedasticity, 48 ECONOMETRICA 817, 817– 38 (1980).
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nearly $1000 million.36 Thus, after controlling for group effects, sample firms have
increased ∆PRE by an average of nearly $1000 million per year from the period before
the AJCA holiday to the period after.
¶23
A second regression is performed that provides information about the change in
∆PRE for each group in the sample. The formula expressing this regression is:
8

∆PRE it = Fg + ∑ c g δ itT δ itg + ε it .
g =1

The dummy variable δ is 0 for firms not in group g and 1 for firms that are in group g.
The value cg is the coefficient of δTδg and indicates the change in ∆PRE from before the
AJCA window to after. This regression determines the values of cg, for g from 1 through
8.
¶24
The row labeled δTδg reports the value of the coefficient cg. The second regression
indicates increases in ∆PRE across all groups, with statistically significant increases
found in groups 1, 3, 4, 5, and 8, as shown in column (b) of Table 4. The increases in
these groups are substantial as well, ranging from about $500 million to nearly $4000
million per firm per year.
¶25
Because an increase in ∆PRE may be related to an increase in PIFO,37 it is
informative to analyze changes in PIFO as well. Two regressions are performed to study
the changes in PIFO, and the formulas expressing these regressions are:
g

PIFOit = Fg + c 0δ itT + ε it

and

8

PIFOit = Fg + ∑ c g δ itT δ itg + ε it .
g =1

These regressions are analogous to those performed for ∆PRE above. The coefficient c0
determined by the first regression indicates the average increase in PIFO from the period
before and the period after the AJCA tax holiday for the entire sample of firms. The
coefficients cg, for g from 1 through 8, indicate the average increase in PIFO during this
same change in periods for each group g in the sample of firms.
¶26
As was the case with the regressions having ∆PRE as the dependent variable,
statistically significant increases of substantial magnitude occur from the period before
and after the AJCA tax holiday. Columns (c) and (d) of Table 4 show the results of the
two regressions having PIFO as the dependent variable. In the first regression, the
coefficient of δT is statistically significant at the 1% level and also substantial in size,
nearly $1400 million. In the second regression, PIFO increased for all groups, with
statistically significant increases found in Groups 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8. The increases in these
groups are substantial as well, ranging from about $500 million to nearly $5000 million
per firm per year.

35

In reports of regression results in this Article, the notations *, **, and *** are used to indicate statistical
significance at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. These values are computed using the robust
standard errors described in the above footnote.
36
All amounts in Table 4 are expressed in millions of dollars.
37
Permanently reinvested foreign earnings must come from foreign earnings in the first instance, and so it
is possible that an increase in ∆PRE is driven by an increase in PIFO. It is also possible for ∆PRE to
increase even if PIFO does not increase, assuming the fraction of PIFO classified as permanently
reinvested increases. This latter possibility is investigated further in Part VI(B).
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In summary, the four regressions reported in Table 4 indicate a substantial and
statistically significant increase in both ∆PRE and PIFO for firms in the sample, both in
the aggregate and in many of the groups described in Table 1.

∆PRE
(a)

δT
δTδ1
δTδ2
δTδ3
δTδ4
δTδ5
δTδ6
δTδ7
δTδ8

PIFO
(b)

992.736***
(185.211)

(c)

(d)

1378.241***
(224.920)
760.598*
(395.448)
19.744
(225.629)
1326.327***
(474.244)
897.899***
(260.764)
481.872***
(154.873)
833.768
(706.600)
986.589
(756.830)
3963.333*
(2039.031)

525.717
(764.659)
520.131
(357.201)
1737.044***
(412.049)
1120.445***
(380.581)
539.554***
(90.599)
2407.875**
(1121.512)
2022.494
(1630.182)
4877.078*
(2550.926)

Group Fixed
Y
Y
Y
Y
Effects
Observations
545
545
545
545
2
Adjusted R
0.1255
0.1470
0.1690
0.1933
Table 4: Regression Results for Increase in ∆PRE and PIFO
B. Increase in ∆PRE and PIFO in Relative Terms
¶28

The Part IV(A) analysis indicates that dollar amounts of ∆PRE increased from the
period before the AJCA tax holiday to the period after, but it does not indicate whether
this increase was driven simply by a reclassification of more foreign earnings as PRE, or
by an increase in the overall amount of foreign earnings, or by a mixture of both effects.
The first of these effects might simply constitute an expedient relabeling of earnings by
firms in a way that does not substantially alter their business but positions firms to
capitalize on a future tax holiday. As such, it may not represent a significant behavioral
shift by firms beyond the relabeling itself. The second effect, however, might indicate a
significant change in business strategy, with firms opting to increase investment overseas
instead of in the United States.38 It is thus important to analyze which of these effects is
at work in the ∆PRE increase documented in Part IV(A).
38

It is also possible that foreign earnings have increased because the firm has grown proportionately on a
worldwide basis, in which case both foreign and domestic earnings increase at the same rate. The question
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The following regression tests the relative relationship between ∆PRE and PIFO:
∆PRE it = b0 PIFOit + c 0 PIFOit δ itT + ε it .
The variable δT is the same as in the regressions of Part IV(A). The coefficient c0
indicates the increase in the average factor by which PIFO contributes to ∆PRE from the
period before the AJCA tax holiday to the period after. The coefficient b0 indicates the
baseline average size of this factor over the course of both periods. The average amount
of PIFO classified as ∆PRE increased from about 43% before the AJCA tax holiday to
about 63.2% in the period after the holiday, as indicated in column (a) of Table 5.39 Both
the overall average amount and the amount of increase are statistically significant at the
1% level.
¶30
A second regression tests how the factor by which PIFO contributes to ∆PRE
changed for different groups of firms. This regression is expressed by the formula:
¶29

8

8

g =1

g =1

∆PREit = ∑ bg PIFOit δ itg + ∑ c g PIFOit δ itT δ itg + ε it

The coefficient cg indicates the increase for the group g of the average factor by which
PIFO contributes to ∆PRE from the periods before and after the AJCA tax holiday. The
coefficient bg represents the baseline average size of this factor for group g over the
course of both periods. All groups have statistically significant positive baseline values,
represented by the bg coefficients, seen in column (b) of Table 5. In addition, the only
statistically significant changes in values, represented by the cg coefficients, are positive
as well, and these occur in the case of Groups 4, 7, and 8. The only negative values of cg
are those for Groups 2 and 3, but these are not statistically significant.
¶31
The evidence from the preceding two regressions testing the relationship between
∆PRE and PIFO is consistent with a statistically significant increase in the fraction of
PIFO classified as ∆PRE by firms, with this increase occurring across several subgroups,
and with no decrease occurring in any subgroup at a statistically significant level. Thus,
the evidence is consistent with a relabeling of more foreign earnings as permanently
reinvested by firms in the aggregate and across various subgroups. This evidence
suggests that firms have significant flexibility in classifying foreign earnings as PRE
when it is convenient to do so, indicating that PRE classification may be more of a
discretionary choice than an objective standard. To the extent this is the case, PRE
classification may not reflect a true permanent reinvestment, and it would be more
appropriate to have current accounting recognition of the future U.S. tax liability that will
occur when the funds are ultimately repatriated.
¶32
To test whether the increase in PIFO documented in Part IV(A) arises from a
proportionate worldwide expansion of firm earnings or from a disproportionate increase
in overseas investment, an additional regression analysis tests the relationship between
PIFO and PIDOM, the domestic level of pre-tax earnings. The formula that expresses
this regression is:
PIFOit = b0 PIDOM it + c0 PIDOM it δ itT + ε it .

of whether increases in PIFO correspond to proportionate changes in PIDOM is addressed later in this
Section.
39
The value of 63.2% is calculated as the sum of the b0 and c0 values, which are 43% and 20.2%,
respectively.
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¶33

This regression implicitly assumes that PIFO is a function simply of PIDOM, and
in general other variables likely determine PIFO as well. Despite the possible omission
of additional variables, however, the results of this regression can give an indication of
the first-order relationship between PIFO and PIDOM under the assumption that PIFO
depends only on PIDOM. If c0 is zero, then there is an unchanging relationship between
PIFO and PIDOM, and this is consistent with uniform worldwide expansion by firms in
the period after the holiday. If c0 is positive, PIFO is a relatively larger fraction of
PIDOM in the period after the holiday, and so the fraction of worldwide income
generated outside the United States is larger after the holiday. Similarly, if c0 is negative,
the fraction of worldwide income generated outside the United States is smaller after the
holiday.
¶34
The results of this regression indicate a statistically significant baseline relationship
at the 1% level, with the average PIFO level equal to 50.1% of PIDOM, as reported in
column (c) of Table 5. The incremental change is negative, and this therefore indicates a
decrease in the fraction of worldwide income generated outside the United States. This
negative amount is statistically significant at the 10% level.
¶35
A second regression tests how the factor by which PIDOM contributes to PIFO
changed for different groups of firms. This regression is expressed by the formula:
8

8

g =1

g =1

PIFOit = ∑ bg PIDOM it δ itg + ∑ c g PIDOM it δ itT δ itg + ε it .

¶36

The results of this regression indicate a positive baseline relationship between
PIFO and PIDOM for all groups that is statistically significant for every group but Group
5, as reported in column (d) of Table 5. The results also indicate a positive and
statistically significant increase for Groups 4, 6, and 8. The only groups with a negative
amount of change in the second period are Groups 5 and 7, and only the value for Group
7 is statistically significant. As before, the positive increases indicate an increase in
foreign earnings relative to U.S. earnings, while negative amounts of change indicate the
opposite pattern.
¶37
The evidence from the two regressions testing the relationship between PIFO and
PIDOM is consistent with a substantial increase in the size of PIFO relative to PIDOM
for most groups of firms, with an increase that is also statistically significant for several
groups. For the entire sample of firms, the evidence is consistent with an overall
decrease in the size of PIFO relative to PIDOM. However, the evidence indicates that
this decrease is driven by only the firms in Groups 5 and 7. Thus, the overall evidence is
consistent with an increase in foreign earnings relative to domestic earnings across most
groups in the sample of firms tested.
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X
Xδ1
Xδ2

∆PRE
(X=PIFO)
(a)
(b)
0.430***
0.242***

PIFO
(X=PIDOM)
(c)
(d)
0.501***
0.607***

0.690***
0.901***

0.394***
0.647***

0.292***
0.482**
0.316***

0.476***
0.031
0.309***

0.155***
0.632***

0.550***
0.802***

Xδ
Xδ4
3

Xδ
Xδ6
Xδ7
5

Xδ8
XδT
XδTδ1
XδTδ2
XδTδ3
XδTδ4
XδTδ5
XδTδ6

0.202***

-0.334*
0.140

0.254

-0.368
-0.134

0.213
0.197

0.313***
0.197

0.370**
-0.097

0.135

0.329*
0.220*
XδTδ7
0.665***
T 8
0.141**
1.085***
Xδ δ
Observations
545
545
545
545
Adjusted R2
0.7141
0.7212
0.4639
0.5620
Table 5: Regression Results for Relative Increase in ∆PRE in Terms of PIFO and
Relative Increase in PIFO in Terms of PIDOM
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
¶38

In the wake of the AJCA tax holiday, U.S. firms with foreign subsidiaries have
increased the amount of foreign earnings that they reinvest permanently overseas. The
analysis of Part IV(A) shows that this amount has increased substantially in absolute
dollar terms across sampled firms in the aggregate and in industry-based groups. In the
case of many such groups, the increases are not only substantial but also statistically
significant.
¶39
The increased amount of overseas investment appears to be driven in part by an
increased tendency of firms to classify foreign earnings as permanently reinvested
overseas. The analysis of Part IV(B) shows that the fraction of foreign earnings so
classified increased at substantial and statistically significant levels. This reclassification
may be an expedient way of relabeling funds so as to prepare to take advantage of a
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future repatriation tax holiday without needing to change behavior substantially.
However, the reclassification also means that these funds will be kept outside the United
States for an indefinite period of time. Moreover, if the reclassification is simply an
arbitrary expedient that can be performed at the discretion of the taxpayer, then it does
not seem sensible to allow such a classification to enable firms to avoid current
recognition of future U.S. tax liabilities.
The increased amount of overseas investment also appears to be driven in part by
an increase in foreign earnings relative to domestic earnings of firms in many of the
analyzed industry groups. The analysis of Part IV(B) shows that the fraction of foreign
earnings relative to domestic earnings has increased substantially for all but two of the
industry groups analyzed, and several of the increases are statistically significant. This
trend is consistent with a move of earnings-generating activities by firms from the United
States to foreign jurisdictions.
The pattern of behavior exhibited by firms increasing permanently reinvested
foreign earnings may well have been brought about by the AJCA tax holiday. An
intended consequence of the holiday was to cause substantial amounts of permanently
reinvested foreign earnings to be returned to the United States. A collateral consequence
of substantial proportions, however, is the conditioning of firms to expect future such
holidays and to arrange their affairs accordingly. In this way, the AJCA holiday may
have been responsible for the long-term classification of an increased fraction of foreign
earnings being labeled as permanently reinvested overseas and also for a long-term
increase in the amount of earnings generation that firms carry out overseas rather than in
the United States.
The findings of this Article are broadly consistent with changes in firm behavior
that will allow firms to take the fullest advantage of an anticipated future tax holiday.
However, the findings demonstrate only statistical correlation and not causation, and it is
possible, for example, that other intervening events or changes over time may have
caused the observed differences in firm behavior rather than simply the fact of the AJCA
tax holiday. Nevertheless, the changes in patterns demonstrated by the methods of this
article are sufficiently substantial in terms of dollar magnitude and statistical significance
that they provide strong evidence of a conditioned behavioral change in firms created by
the AJCA tax holiday.
These findings are important not only for evaluating the long-term impact of the
AJCA tax holiday, but also for evaluating the merits of other proposed temporary
holidays and amnesties, both in the arena of permanently reinvested foreign earnings and
in other areas that allow for the possibility of a second holiday at some future point.
Lawmakers must exercise care in weighing not only the short-term intended
consequences but also the long-term behavioral changes induced by the prospect of future
holidays. In the case of the AJCA tax holiday, these long-term effects were substantial
and perhaps outweighed the short-term benefits, resulting in a net policy failure, at least
to the extent that the policy goal was the long-term net return of foreign earnings to the
United States.
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A. Appendix
Research Sample - Organized by Group
(1) Food, Beverage and Tobacco
Manufacturing
Altria Group, Inc.
Coca-Cola Enterprises
Coca-Cola Co.
Heinz (H.J.)
Kellogg Co.
PepsiCo Inc.
(2) Wood Product and Paper Manufacturing
International Paper
Kimberly-Clark
Louisiana Pacific
3M Company
Weyerhaeuser Corp.
(3) Petroleum, Coal Products and Chemical
Manufacturing
Abbott Labs
Allergan, Inc.
Amerada Hess
Bausch & Lomb
Baxter International Inc.
Bristol-Myers Squibb
Colgate-Palmolive
Du Pont (E.I.)
Eastman Kodak
Forest Laboratories
IMS Health Inc.
Johnson & Johnson
Lilly (Eli) & Co.
Merck & Co.
Pfizer, Inc.
Praxair, Inc.
Procter & Gamble
Schering-Plough
Wyeth
(4) Computer and Electrical Equipment
Manufacturing
Agilent Technologies
Analog Devices
Apple Computer
Cisco Systems
Dell Inc.
Emerson Electric
EMC Corp.
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Hewlett-Packard
Intel Corp.
International Bus. Machines
Lexmark Int'l Inc.
Medtronic Inc.
Motorola Inc.
Sun Microsystems
Texas Instruments
Tellabs, Inc.
(5) Machinery, Equipment and
Miscellaneous Manufacturing
Bard (C.R.) Inc.
Becton, Dickinson
Black & Decker Corp.
Boston Scientific
Ford Motor
Hasbro Inc.
Honeywell Int'l Inc.
Illinois Tool Works
Johnson Controls
Mattel, Inc.
PACCAR Inc.
Stryker Corp.
(6) Software and Telecommunications
Autodesk, Inc.
BMC Software
Microsoft Corp.
Oracle Corp.
Verizon Communications
(7) Finance and Insurance
Bank of America Corp.
Citigroup Inc.
Franklin Resources
JPMorgan Chase & Co.
Marsh & McLennan
Merrill Lynch
Morgan Stanley
(8) Accommodation, Food and Other
General Electric
McDonald's Corp.
Starwood Hotels & Resorts

